On Plato’s View On Unity, The Polis, The Citizen, and Justice
By Marpheen S. Chann-Berry
In my reading of the Republic, I find myself compelled to agree with him on his ideals of Justice but find it difficult to embrace the theory he lays out in terms of obtaining it in its ideal form. Like Plato, I would argue that Justice exists to protect citizens from varied forms of injustice while establishing a foundation through which citizens can exist as equals. However, the means with which we obtain ideal Justice, contrary to what Plato argues, would not be within the constructs of total deprivation of things other than the body, but would rather come about through the establishment of a system of Justice, i.e. courts and other legal institutions, in which citizens are free to acquire material possessions but do so in a manner that upholds the ideals of equality and equal justice under the law. Before making my argument in full, however, it would be to present Plato’s arguments in regard to the relation between unity, the Polis, the citizen, and Justice.
Plato throughout the Republic employs the legacy of Socrates in order to invoke a thoughtful and philosophical discussion concerning the nature of Justice, which by nature brings into consideration the roles of politics and socioeconomics. Plato’s concern about Justice drives him, through the dialogue between Socrates, Thrasymachus, Glaucon, Adeimantus and various others, to address the varied views on the profitability of being just or unjust, which leads us ultimately to ask, “What exactly is Justice?” Striving to make his point, Plato begins to depict an ideal polis, or city, that consists of interdependent citizens who in order to maintain unity and the good of all, must inevitably choose Justice over injustice.
First we must examine what Plato envisions exactly in terms of the relationship that, according to him, should exist between unity, the polis and the citizen. Calling upon the aid of Socrates, Plato in Book II of the Republic begins to lay the foundation of the ideal city that would lend substantial “evidence” to his overall argument regarding Justice, first of all, saying that, “… a city, as I believe, comes into being because each of us isn’t self-sufficient but is in need of much.”1This passage brings to light Plato’s view that polis’ or cities naturally come into being because people have needs that cannot be met outside of a unified polis structure. In other words, social and economic interdependence brings about a sense of political unity (a polis), from which some varied form of government is born. Government, in this case, is established so that Justice can be administered in order to preserve the existing unity and to promote the well being of the polis as a whole.
From this point, Plato continues establishing and building the imaginative polis by pointing out that a polis would be better off if each citizen functions and refines themselves in whatever task their nature compels them to perform best. Plato makes this argument when he puts forth in 423d:
“This was intended to make plain that each of the other citizens too must be brought to that which naturally suits him - one man, one job - so that each man, practicing his own, which is one, will not become many but one; and thus, you see, the whole city will naturally grow to be one and not many.”2
As stated earlier, Plato argues that a city naturally comes into being because social and economic interdependence brings about some sense of political unity , from which a structure of government is born. The point he made in terms of one man practicing the one thing that he is naturally suited for, can be likened to the economic principles of comparative advantage and globalization. Whereas comparative advantage in macroeconomics deals with individual countries producing what they produce best as compared to other countries and globalization can be described as the increasing economic interdependency that exists between nations. In order to draw the comparison, we need only to think in terms of individual citizens rather than individual countries.
Now that we have established what Plato has in mind in regards to the relationship between unity, the polis, and the citizen, we must now move on to what he argues is the most viable definition of justice and its ramifications for the citizens of a polis. With his imaginative polis in mind, Plato puts forth, “Then is that city best governed which is most like a single human being? … I suppose, then, that when one of its citizens suffers anything at all, either good or bad, such a city will most of all say that the affected part is its own, and all will share in the joy or pain.”3
In contrast to what Plato argues in terms of justice, he argues that injustice is what tears a polis and its citizens apart and is what prohibits any society from accomplishing what is just in regards to the common good. He lays this out in a question he poses to Thrasymachus in 352, that whenever injustice is spread within any sect of society it is, “… unable to accomplish anything together with itself due to faction and difference, and then it makes that thing an enemy both to itself and to everything opposite and to the just?”4
Plato seems to be preoccupied with the notion, given the statements provided above, that Justice exists for the common good of all on an equal basis. That Justice coexists and is interdependent with Equality in terms of the stark difference he draws between the public and private lives of citizens. He argues in the latter part of 464d, “Won’t lawsuits and complaints against one another virtually vanish from among them thanks to their possessing nothing private but the body, while the rest is in common?”5 He goes on to say that this will lead the polis from harboring division and disunity in the form of factions in regards to material possessions and family matters.
My definition of Justice is that it is the preservation of order, unity and equality within a society and exists to provide a standard through which those who practice injustice are justly reprimanded for their actions. Justice, however, cannot exist in a society that harbors inequality, for it would be a society that would be much like Thrasymachus’ view that justice is the advantage of the stronger.6Thrasymachus might have been arguing from a standpoint of realism, but it was more of a definition of injustice rather than justice. How can justice exist if the stronger employ injustice to fulfill their own needs? Justice never wields injustice in order to maintain unity and civility. Instead, Justice proceeds on the basis of equality in order to justly administer and adjudicate what is best for the common good. William Penn best explains it when he states in Some Fruits of Solitude that,”Justice is justly represented blind, because she sees no difference in the parties concerned. She has but one scale and weight, for rich and poor, great and small.”7
As I have stated previously in regards to my support of Plato’s definition of Justice, he will find my support lacking somewhat in terms of the way in which we obtain it in its ideal form. Whereas Plato argues for the establishment of a society in which each citizen is allowed only the private possession of his body and the rest being under common jurisdiction, I would argue that it is injustice itself to deprive individual citizens access to private possessions other than their own body. While I do not totally disagree on Plato’s path to Justice, I am more of an Aristotelian in terms of what Aristotle argues for when he says, “Even if the end is the same for an individual and for a city-state, that of the city-state seems at any rate greater and more complete to attain and preserve. For although it is worthy to attain it for only an individual, it is nobler and more divine to do so for a nation or city-state”8
Whereas I believe the common good is what is ultimately good and most just, I do not necessarily believe that acquisition of material possessions, to an extent, does not keep a society from obtaining the ideal form of Justice. Citizens can acquire material possessions justly if a system of Justice provides the means through which it can be done. In terms of individual freedom, I agree to some extent with what John Stuart Mills argues for in On Liberty when he states,
“The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental or spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.”9
While I do understand, from Plato’s perspective, that division is formed because citizens are more preoccupied with their own well-being as opposed to the well being the society as a whole, I would make the argument that it is injustice itself to deprive citizens of the right to acquire personal possession apart from their own bodies. Plato seems to implement a sort of class structure into his ideal polis in Book III of the Republic when he begins to explain the creation of the class of guardians and rulers and how they are to be exclusive and educated in a particular way. The best and brightest among the guardians are then to be made the rulers of the city. In this case, is Plato not supporting Thrasymachus’ argument that justice is the advantage of the stronger? Going back to what Thrasymachus’ said in regards to how rulers determine what is just, how can Plato’s ideal of justice ultimately differ in outcome from Thrasymachus’ when those who are the best and brightest, i.e. those who have an advantage over others, are allotted the highest positions within the polis?
In conclusion, I would argue that there is no way for Plato to obtain ideal Justice with the means with which he would like to achieve that Justice. Ideal Justice is obtained when all individuals embrace the fact that we are all equals because we are all Human. From the basis of equality, we can then construct a system of Justice through which we can maintain and preserve that equality and unite the world under one just system; united as a universal Polis. To sum up my arguments, Justice exists as a means to preserve the unity that exists within a society and as a standard through which it can justly adjudicate and administer punishment to those who practice injustice in its varied forms. Secondly, Justice cannot exist if a citizenry is not beholden to the law on an equal basis and do not hold a standard of equality amongst each other. Finally, citizens are free to acquire possessions as “private” apart from their own bodies and can do so justly if a system of Justice provides a means through which acquisition of possessions can be practiced justly.
Notes
1. Bloom, Allan. The Republic of Plato (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 45-46.
2. Bloom, Allan. The Republic of Plato (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 101.
3. Bloom, Allan. The Republic of Plato (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 142.
4. Bloom, Allan. The Republic of Plato (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 31.
5. Bloom, Allan. The Republic of Plato (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 144.
6. Bloom, Allan. The Republic of Plato (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 15.
7. Penn, William. Fruits of Solitude. Vol. I, Part 3. The Harvard Classics. New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1909–14; Bartleby.com, 2001. www.bartleby.com/1/3/. (accessed September 29, 2011).
8. Miller, Fred. “Aristotle’s Political Theory”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/aristotle-politics/>. (acessed September 29, 2011).
9. Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty. London: Longman, Roberts & Green, 1869; Bartleby.com, 1999. www.bartleby.com/130/. (accessed September 29, 2011).
Bibliography
1. Bloom, Allan. The Republic of Plato (New York: Basic Books, 1991).
2. Miller, Fred. “Aristotle’s Political Theory”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/aristotle-politics/>. (acessed September 29, 2011).
3. Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty. London: Longman, Roberts & Green, 1869; Bartleby.com, 1999. www.bartleby.com/130/. (accessed September 29, 2011).
4. Penn, William. Fruits of Solitude. Vol. I, Part 3. The Harvard Classics. New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1909–14; Bartleby.com, 2001. www.bartleby.com/1/3/. (accessed September 29, 2011).
