Good & Bad Corruption?
By Marpheen S. Chann-Berry
From my perspective, I would argue that Democracy is a gradual process through which citizens engage and participate in the general welfare of their respective nation as a whole. No democracy exists in perfection and can never exist as such because democracy is always a work in progress. This is due to the fact that traditions, values, and beliefs change overtime as a nation develops and as each generation assumes the mantle of leadership. I would like to propose the idea that corruption can at times serve as a necessary evil or a form of “good” in the sense that corruption must occur so as to continue the progress toward a “more perfect democracy”. Tradition on the other hand can be at times the greatest of evils in that it stifles continual democratization in the interest of preserving itself. In other words, if change was not allowed to occur because “history” was being threatened, there exists no democracy whatsoever, but in its stead a form of authoritarian rule on the part of tradition.
My argument follows somewhat along the lines of what Frederick Nietzsche writes in On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life, when he says:
”So: it is possible to live with almost no memories, even to live happily as the animal shows; but without forgetting it is quite impossible to live at all. Or, to say it more simply yet: there is a degree of insomnia, of rumination, of historical sense which injures every living thing and finally destroys it, be it a man, a people or a culture.”[1]
In the opening chapters of On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life, Nietzsche draws a distinction between balanced use and excess use of history, whether it is used in the effort to enhance and live life or whether it is used to inhibit and to extract the “life” out of life, or what he refers to as the “gravedigger” of the present. When laying this out, he presents three different forms of history that each serve life to some extent.
The first form of history is that of monumental history, which is used to feed ones drive to amount to something greater and to achieve what has been achieved only by the greatest among peoples and cultures. Nietzsche refers to a person who wields monumental history to their advantage as a “man of action” or one who looks to history and past greatness as a call to action. History in the monumental sense resembles an active form of history, a greater form if you will, that seeks to continue on “eternally” and to recreate and replicate greatness; to create and generate life.[2] Yet despite its ability to motivate an individual, Nietzsche points out that monumental history can at times be a distorted history in that it places the importance upon the effect of an event rather than the causes of that event. He warns:
”… as long as the past must be described as something worthy of imitation, something that can be imitated and is possible a second time, so long, at least, is the past in danger of being somewhat distorted, of being reinterpreted according to aesthetic criteria and so brought closer to fiction…”[3]
Antiquarian history on the other hand is the form of history that seeks to preserve the past so that future generations might also enjoy what the Antiquarian so lovingly preserves. From what I could understand, the Antiquarian individual safeguards his history to the point that it becomes his identity. I make this conclusion based on Nietzsche’s description of the Antiquarian when he says, “The history of his city becomes for him the history of self… and finds himself, his strength, his diligence, his pleasure, his judgment, his folly and rudeness, in all of them.”[4] However, Nietzsche also warns against the excess use of this form of history, since it serves past life rather than present life. The dangers of Antiquarian history lies in its inherent nature to “mummify” life; to preserve rather than to generate. It differs from monumental history in that it, “… underestimates what is in the process of becoming… Thus it hinders the powerful resolve for new life, thus it paralyzes the man of action…”[5]
Critical history is the form of history that engages the individual or a society in the act of either condemning a history or outright annihilating it. Nietzsche describes this form of history as a dangerous one and as “…an attempt, as it were, a posteriori to give oneself a past from which one would like to be descended in opposition to the past from which one is descended…”[6]
Critical history serves life in the sense that it can be used to weed out the errors and crimes of previous generations. Nietzsche is quick to point out, however, that doing so does not rid oneself of one’s origins or a society of its birth. The danger that lies with critical history is inherent within the exchange process and the possibility of replacing what Nietzsche describes as the “first nature” (that which we were born into) with a weaker nature. In other words, you might replace something you deem as bad with something worse.[7]
Given the three forms of history, Nietzsche is not arguing that history has no place within society, but rather that a man, people, or a culture should learn to be masters of history rather than slaves to history. He argues that in order to do this, a society must realize its inherent “plastic power” and that power being the ability to “… grow out of itself, transforming and assimilating everything past and alien, to heal wounds, replace what is lost and reshape broken forms out of itself.”[8] Nietzsche advocates the balanced use of the three forms of history together, making sure that no one form is used in excess over the others. In order to avoid the corrupting power of excess history, he believes that it is important to, “… forget at the right time as well as to remember at the right time.”[9]
Machiavelli’s sense of corruption, on the other hand, comes about through the departure from the founding principles upon which a government is founded. He lays this out when he states:
“For all political and religious movements, all republics and monarchies must have some good in them at the start… but as time goes by, their original goodness becomes corrupted, and, unless something happens that brings them back to first principles, corruption inevitably destroys the organization.”[10]
In order to bring an institution or government back to its first principles, Machiavelli proposes that an organization should be created in such a way as to permit periodic reforms so as to avoid corruption. A state has two circumstances through which it can return to its original goodness, whether it be an external factor such as a foreign invasion or through domestic wisdom.
To give an example of an external factor that would bring a state back to its original goodness, Machiavelli refers to the sack of Rome in 390 B.C., when a Gallic tribe known as the Senones (Machiavelli refers to them as the French) were led by their general Brennus and defeated a Roman army at the Battle of Allia. Rome was left vulnerable, leading to the event mentioned by Machiavelli in theDiscourses. According to Machiavelli, the wrath of Fortuna was appeased when the Romans committed themselves once again to the respect of religion and justice which then allowed them to reclaim their political freedom.[11]
The second type of reform Machiavelli refers to is that which is brought about through domestic wisdom, which is best explained in his own words when he states, “… it best arises either as a result of a legal requirement that the members of an institution frequently take stock, or because one good man appears among them and, by his own example and his skillful policies, has the same effect as such a law.”[12] In this type of reform, he further stresses the importance of a virtuof either a man or a law.
In terms of my argument that corruption is a necessary evil, I use the term “corruption” in a stipulative sense in that there is both good and bad corruption, much like the word “consequence”. Within the context of a democratic society, corruption in the negative sense is a force that is counterproductive in that it brings about the destruction of the “original goodness” of the society in which it is active. It is important to note here that not all values and traditions should be done away with because some values and traditions are in fact worth protecting. The “original goodness” and the value and tradition that is worth protecting in a democratic society is that of democracy. In this case, any force that is counterproductive and detrimental to the value and tradition of Democracy, whether it be political or military force, is a prime example of negative corruption and should therefore be countered either by the virtu of an antiquarian individual or people or through that of an antiquarian law.
Positive Corruption, on the other hand, is a force that seeks to enhance democracy by bringing about an end to values and traditions that have ceased to be a positive democratic influence. Democracy is a form of government based on Abraham Lincoln’s statement that it is a “… government of the people, for the people, and by the people.” This is vital to my argument in that a democratic government ceases to be a democracy when it abandons the will of the people. A democratic or republic government ceases to be representative if it refuses to change with the times, as Machiavelli refers to when he makes the point that, “.. a republic should survive longer and should more frequently have fortune on its side… for a republic can adapt itself more easily to changing circumstances because it can call on citizens of different characters.”[13] Later on he made the point that, “… cities are destroyed, for the institutions of a republic are never modified to suit changing circumstances.”[14] The process of changing with the times, or positive corruption, can at times only be employed through Nietzsche’s “critical history”, or the doing away of the “first nature” in order to enact a better and more refined “second nature”. Both Machiavelli and Nietzsche are in agreement, though, in terms of the importance of change, how should come about, and how it could end up as negative change (negative corruption) or positive change (positive corruption).
In regards as to whether the act of lying would be beneficial in bringing a corrupt regime back to being a non-corrupt regime, I would say that Nietzsche would definitely agree that it is at times needed, especially when he presents his points on critical history. But he warns against excessive use of this in both critical history, where lying would occur in what he says is an attempt to give oneself a past from which one would like to be descended, and in monumental history when he says that a person can be so consumed with the greatness of the past that he distorts it and it becomes indistinguishable “…between a monumental past and a mythical fiction…”[15]
As to what Machiavelli would argue in regards to lying in politics, I would point to his chapter on to what extent a ruler should keep his word. In making his point, Machiavelli makes the argument that a man should learn to be both a man and an animal; he should know when to abide by and when to break the rules. Machiavelli doesn’t make the argument that lying is inherently good, “… but since men are wicked and will not keep faith with you, you need not keep faith with them.”[16] However, he warns that if you are going to lie that it is also important to conceal the fact that you are a crafty little fox.
In conclusion, my argument that there exists both good and bad corruption, in that positive corruption serves to enhance and effect positive democratic change and that negative corruption is counterproductive in that it is detrimental and negative change, is a synthesis of both Machiavelli’s and Nietzsche’s view of corruption. Positive corruption in Machiavellian terms would be the positive effect of “changing with the times. In light of Nietzsche’s historical sense, positive corruption is the balanced application of monumental, antiquarian, and critical history. Negative corruption in Machiavellian terms would be the corruption that brings about the departure of a republic or society from its basic “original goodness”. To put it in Nietzsche’s light, negative corruption is the out of balance and excess use of one form of history over another that eventually brings about the end of a man, a people, or a culture.
Endnotes
[1] Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1980), 10.
[2] Nietzsche, On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life, 14-15.
[3] Nietzsche, On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life, 17.
[4] Nietzsche, On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life, 19.
[5] Nietzsche, On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life, 21.
[6] Nietzsche, On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life, 22.
[7] Nietzsche, On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life, 21-22.
[8] Nietzsche, On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life, 10.
[9] Nietzsche, On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life, 10.
[10] David Wootton, trans., Machiavelli: Selected Political Writings (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994), 190.
[11] Wootton, Machiavelli, 190.
[12] Wootton, Machiavelli, 190.
[13] Wootton, Machiavelli, 199.
[14] Wootton, Machiavelli, 200.
[15] Nietzsche, On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life, 17.
[16] Wootton, Machiavelli, 54.